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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Edward Nicholas Bursiel appeals from the judgment entered upon his
guilty plea to one count of enticing a child through the use of the Internet. For
the first time on appeal Bursiel argues the state violated his due process rights
by recommending a sentence different than that contemplated by the plea
agreement. He also argues the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Forty-six-year-old

Bursiel

posted

a

personal

ad

on

the

"Casual

Encounters" section of Craigslist in which he "claimed to be looking for sexual
encounters with, 'Any race, size, or age. I don't care."' (PSI, p.3.) Posing as a
14-year-old girl named "Nicki Scott," a detective responded to the ad. (Id.) Over
the next six days Bursiel engaged in online conversations with "Nicki" and told
her "she was not too young," and he had previously "been with a 14 year old"
and "enjoyed teaching her things." (Id.) He also "sent ["Nicki"] a picture of his
erect penis and explained in detail how he would make her feel 'good' without it
hurting." (Id.) Bursiel and "Nicki" arranged to meet but, before Bursiel arrived at
the designated meeting place, officers stopped him and arrested him for child
enticement. (Id.) At the time of his arrest Bursiel had "two packs of lubricant and
two condoms in the center console" of his vehicle. (Id.)
The state charged Bursiel with one count of felony enticing a child through
the use of the Internet and one count of misdemeanor disseminating material
harmful to minors. (R., pp.65-66.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Bursiel pied

1

guilty to the felony enticement charge and the state dismissed the misdemeanor.
(7/14/14 Tr., p.4, L.3 - p.8, L.21.) The "Written Guilty Plea" set forth additional
terms of the plea agreement, as follows:
The State will recommend a sentence of three (3) years
determinate, ten (10) years indeterminate, not to exceed thirteen
(13) years, suspended, with sixty (60) days local jail time as a
condition of probation. Remaining sentencing considerations left to
the discretion of the Court. Defense free to argue for a lesser
sentence.
(R., p.145a 1 (underlining omitted).) The district court also recited these terms

when taking

Bursiel's guilty plea,

and

Bursiel confirmed that was

his

understanding of the state's offer. (7/14/14 Tr., p.6, Ls.8-19.) Following the plea
colloquy, the district court accepted Bursiel's plea and set the matter for
sentencing. (7/14/14 Tr., p.7, L.22-p.8, L.14; see also R., p.150.)
At

the

sentencing

hearing

the

prosecutor

made

the

following

representation:
There is a plea agreement in this matter.
The plea
agreement is that the State will recommend a sentence of five
years fixed, five years indeterminate, for a total unified sentence of
ten years. That that be suspended. That he be placed on
supervised probation. And that the Court impose 60 days of local
jail as a condition of that probation.
(9/5/14 Tr., p.17, L.22 -

p.18, L.4.)

The prosecutor made no further

recommendations, and neither Bursiel nor his defense counsel objected to or
otherwise disputed the prosecutor's representation of the plea agreement. (See

1

The page of the Clerk's Record on which the purported terms of the plea
agreement appear is unnumbered but falls between pages 145 and 146. For
ease of reference, the state will hereinafter cite the unnumbered page as "R.,
p.145a."
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generally 9/5/14 Tr.)

Defense counsel argued for a three-year term of

supervised probation but did not recommend any specific underlying sentence.
(9/15/14 Tr., p.18, L.7-p.20, L.13.) Citing Bursiel's "concerning" criminal record
and the psychosexual evaluation, which "indicate[d] a problem and a lack of
recognition and a need for treatment," the district court "adopt[ed] the State's
recommendation for a ten year sentence:
indeterminate" but retained jurisdiction.

Five years fixed, five years

(9/15/14 Tr., p.22, L.9 - p.24, L.18.)

Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the
balance of Bursiel's sentence and placed him on probation. 2 (Augmentations:
3/20/15 Judgment And Disposition On Jurisdictional Review (Probation Granted);
3/20/15

Amended

Judgment And

Disposition

On

Jurisdictional

Review

(Probation Granted).)
Bursiel timely appealed from the judgment. (R., pp.167-70, 175-78.)

In

her opening brief, Bursiel's appellate counsel argued, for the first time on appeal,
that the state breached the plea agreement by recommending an underlying
sentence in excess of that contemplated by the parties' agreement. (Appellant's
brief, pp.4-10.)

In response to this argument, and with the district court's

permission, both the county prosecutor and Bursiel's trial counsel filed sworn
affidavits which, in summary, state that (1) the portion of Bursiel's "Written Guilty
Plea" that purported to outline the terms of the parties' plea agreement, and that

2

According to the Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository, Bursiel is currently
awaiting an evidentiary hearing on allegations that he has violated his probation.
See Case Number Result Page for Bonner Co. Case No. CR-2014-2620 at
https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseNumberResults.do.
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was recited by the district court at the change of plea hearing, was incorrect; and
(2) under the actual terms of the plea agreement negotiated by the parties the
state was required to recommend a suspended sentence and local jail time as a
condition of probation but was not bound to recommend any specific underlying
sentence.

("Motion To Augment Record And Stipulation" (filed 9/24/15);

"Affidavit" of Louis Marshall and attachments (filed 9/24/15); "Affidavit" of Daniel
Taylor and attachments (filed 9/24/15); "Order Augmenting Record" (filed
9/28/15). 3) The district court entered an order "augmenting" the affidavits into
the trial court record on September 28, 2015. ("Order Augmenting Record" (filed
9/28/15).)

3

Contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, the state has filed a motion to
augment the appellate record with file-stamped copies of the cited motion,
affidavits and order. For this Court's convenience, copies of the cited documents
are attached to this brief as Appendix A.
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ISSUES
Bursiel states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the State breach its obligations under the plea
agreement by recommending a sentence greater than it had
agreed to recommend, thus depriving Mr. Bursiel of his right
to due process of law?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a
unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, upon Mr.
Bursiel following his plea of guilty to enticement?

(Appellant's brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Should this Court decline to review Bursiel's unpreserved claim that the
prosecutor breached the plea agreement because Bursiel cannot show
from the record that any breach occurred, much less that the alleged
breach constitutes fundamental error?

2.

Has Bursiel failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an underlying unified sentence of ten years, with five years
fixed, upon his guilty plea to enticing a child through the use of the
Internet?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Bursiel Has Failed To Show The Prosecutor Breached The Plea Agreement,
Much Less That The Alleged Breach Constitutes Fundamental Error

A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal Bursiel argues the prosecutor violated his due

process rights by recommending a sentence with a fixed term in excess of that
contemplated by the plea agreement.

(Appellant's brief, pp.4-10.) This Court

should decline to entertain Bursiel's unpreserved claim because Bursiel cannot
show from the existing record that any breach occurred, much less that the
alleged breach constitutes fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
When raised for the first time on appeal, a claim that the state breached a

plea agreement will only be reviewed for fundamental error.

State v. Gomez,

153 Idaho 253, 281 P.3d 90 (2012); State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782, 241 P.3d
955 (201 O); State v. Stocks, 153 Idaho 171, 280 P.3d 198 (Ct. App. 2012).
"Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law to be
reviewed by this Court de nova, in accordance with contract law standards."
State v. Schultz, 150 Idaho 97, 244 P.3d 241 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v.
Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005) (and case cited therein);
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1430 (2009)).
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C.

Bursiel Cannot Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In Relation To
His Claim That The Prosecutor Breached The Plea Agreement
Because

Bursiel

did

not

object

to

the

prosecutor's

sentencing

recommendation, in order to be entitled to relief, he has the burden of showing
the error he claims is fundamental.

The fundamental error standard requires

Bursiel to show (1) a violation of a constitutional right, (2) error that is "clear or
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision," and (3) the alleged error "affected [his] substantial rights,
meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings." Stocks, 153 Idaho at 174,280 P.3d at 201 (quoting State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010)). Bursiel cannot carry his burden
of demonstrating fundamental error because he cannot show that the prosecutor
breached the plea agreement at all, much less that the alleged breach is clear on
the existing appellate record.
There is no question that, when the state breaches its obligation under a
plea agreement to recommend a specific sentence, such breach violates the
defendant's due process rights.

Puckett, 556 U.S. at 136 (citing Santobello v.

New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971 )); Gomez, 153 Idaho at 256, 281 P.3d at 93;
Stocks, 153 Idaho at 173, 280 P.3d at 200; Schultz, 150 Idaho at 99, 244 P.3d at
243.

To establish a due process violation, however, it is Bursiel's burden to

prove both the existence of a plea agreement and the fact of its breach. Gomez,
153 Idaho at 257, 281 P.3d at 94 (citing State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595,
226 P.3d 535, 537 (2010) (and case cited therein)). In an attempt to carry this

7

burden, Bursiel's appellate counsel points out that the recommendation the
prosecutor made at sentencing for an underlying sentence of ten years, with five
years fixed, was "at odds with" the terms of the parties' "oral plea agreement" placed on the record by the district court at the change of plea hearing - that
called for a recommended underlying sentence of thirteen years, with only three
years fixed.

(Appellant's brief, p.6 (citing 7/14/14 Tr., p.6, Ls.8-11; 9/5/14 Tr.,

p.17, L.23- p.18, L.4); see also R., p.145a.) If the "Written Guilty Plea" and the
change of plea transcript were the only evidence in the record of the parties'
agreement, the state would readily acknowledge a potential breach (although not
necessarily a "clear" one given the possible tactical reasons Bursiel might not
have objected to a recommendation for an overall shorter sentence); other
evidence in the record shows, however, that there was no breach.
After Bursiel's appellate counsel filed her opening brief alleging the
prosecutor's sentencing recommendation breached the plea agreement, both the
prosecutor and Bursiel's trial counsel filed sworn affidavits (with attachments)
disputing there was a breach. (See Appendix A.) According to those affidavits attested to by the people who actually negotiated Bursiel's plea agreement - (1)
the terms of the plea agreement that were set forth in Bursiel's "Written Guilty
Plea" and recited by the district court at the change of plea hearing were
incorrect, and (2) under the actual terms of the plea agreement negotiated by the
parties the state was required to recommend a suspended sentence and local
jail time as a condition of probation but was not bound to recommend any
specific underlying sentence. (Id.) Because the individuals who were actually
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parties to Bursiel's plea agreement have supplemented the trial court record with
evidence showing the state was never obligated to recommend any specific
underlying sentence, Bursiel cannot carry his appellate burden of demonstrating
that the prosecutor's recommendation for a unified sentence of ten years, with
five years fixed, in any way breached the agreement.
Even if Bursiel could show a potential breach based on the fact that the
prosecutor's sentencing recommendation was different than that contained in the
"Written Guilty Plea" and articulated at the change of plea hearing, he certainly
cannot carry his burden under the fundamental error standard of demonstrating
the alleged error is clear. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978; see also
Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (under "plain-error review" alleged error must be "clear
or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute").

Tellingly, at no time

during sentencing did Bursiel or his trial counsel object to the prosecutor's
sentencing recommendation (see generally 9/5/14 Tr.); nor has Bursiel ever
moved in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea (see generally R.).
Apparently without having ever consulted Bursiel's trial attorney, Bursiel's
appellate attorney posits that trial counsel's failure to object could not have been
a tactical decision because "[t]here is no strategic advantage to permitting the
State to advocate in favor of a higher fixed sentence" than that to which the
parties had previously agreed. (Appellant's brief, p.9.) However, a review of the
affidavits filed by the prosecutor and Bursiel's trial attorney after Bursiel's
appellate counsel leveled the allegation of breach clearly suggests the opposite.
Even if not dispositive as to the terms of the plea agreement and Bursiel's
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understanding of it, those affidavits show at the very least that the reason trial
counsel did not object to the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation was
because he did not believe that recommendation actually violated any term of
the plea agreement he and the prosecutor actually negotiated. (See Appendix
A.) The error Bursiel's appellate attorney alleges for the first time on appeal is

thus far from clear and fails under the second prong of the fundamental error
analysis.
In Puckett v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court observed that the
trial court is ordinarily in the best position to adjudicate a breach of plea claim "in
the first instance." Puckett, 556 U.S. at 140. This is especially true in cases
such as this one, where the breach is not conceded, because the trial court is
uniquely situated to determine the relevant facts and, thereby, facilitate appellate
review.
case.

kl

The soundness of this rationale is exemplified by the facts of this

Bursiel's appellate attorney argues the prosecutor breached the plea

agreement, but neither Bursiel nor his trial counsel objected to the prosecutor's
sentencing recommendation and there is now evidence in the record suggesting
the agreement that was put on the record at the change of plea hearing was not
the agreement the parties actually negotiated in order to secure Bursiel's plea.
In light of this evidence, Bursiel cannot carry his appellate burden of
demonstrating any error at all, much less one that is clear on the existing record.
This Court should therefore decline to review Bursiel's unpreserved appellate
claim.
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11.
Bursiel Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Bursiel argues the unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed,

imposed upon his conviction for enticing a child through the use of the Internet is
excessive in light several "mitigating factors" he claims exist in this case.
(Appellant's brief, pp.11-13.)

The record, however, supports the sentence

imposed. Bursiel has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.

Anderson, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v.
Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

Bursiel Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any
Reasonable View Of The Facts
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to

establish that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136
Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho
831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).

To carry this burden, Bursiel must show that his

sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho
at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the
primary objective of protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382,
384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978).

The Court reviews the whole sentence on
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appeal and presumes that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the
defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726,
170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not

substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might
differ. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,568,650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
Bursiel trolled the Internet for someone of '"[a]ny race, size, or age"' with
whom to have a sexual encounter. (PSI, p.3.) When someone Bursiel believed
was a 14-year-old girl responded to Bursiel's ad, Bursiel engaged her in sexually
explicit conversations, sent her a picture of his erect penis and arranged to meet
her for sex. (Id.)
In imposing Bursiel's sentence, the district court indicated it was "looking
at all four" objectives of sentencing, including the protection of society. (9/5/14
Tr., p.22, Ls.9-15.) The court was concerned by Bursiel's criminal record, which
included two prior felony convictions - including a conviction for manufacturing
and possessing an explosive device for which Bursiel spent 40 months in federal
prison - as well as two misdemeanor convictions and other charges, such as
assault and domestic violence, that indicated to the court that Bursiel had
"issues" or "problems" with women. (9/5/14 Tr., p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.4; PSI, pp.46.) "The most concerning thing to the Court," however, was the psychosexual
evaluation which indicated that Bursiel had "a problem and a lack of recognition
and a need for treatment" that would best be accomplished in a prison setting.
(9/5/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.16-19; see also Psychosexual Eval., pp.1, 20 (opining
Bursiel "has a low amenability for treatment" and "would be a good candidate for

12

a prison based program").)

"Balancing all [of] that out," the district court

determined, in an exercise of discretion, that an underlying unified sentence of
ten years, with five years fixed, and a period of retained jurisdiction was
reasonable in light of Bursiel's character and the nature of his crime. (9/5/14 Tr.,
p.23, Ls.5-22.)
On appeal, Bursiel cites his military service, employment history and
purported remorse as factors he claims the court failed to properly consider in
fashioning an appropriate sentence.

(Appellant's brief, pp.11-13.)

All of this

information was before the court and considered by it at the time of sentencing.
(See 9/5/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.15-17 (district court indicated it had reviewed the
presentence report and psychosexual evaluation).) That Bursiel disagrees with
how the district court weighed the evidence and balanced the objectives of
sentencing does not show an abuse of discretion. See State v. Windom, 150
Idaho 873, 879, 253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011) ("In this case, Windom essentially
asks this Court to re-weigh the evidence presented to the district court and reach
a different conclusion . . ..

However, our role is not to reweigh the evidence

considered by the district court; our role is to determine whether reasonable
minds could reach the same conclusion as did the district court.").
Based on the nature of the offense, Bursiel's character, and the
objectives of sentencing, a unified sentence ten years, with five years fixed, is
not excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.
show an abuse of discretion.
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Bursiel has failed to

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Bursiel's judgment
and sentence.
DATED this 13th day of October, 2015.

~ ~ 0 ~--

~FLEMING~:::Deputy Attorney General
__)

CERTI Fl CATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of October, 2015, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

LAF/dd
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127 S. First Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
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IN THE DISTBJcr COURT OFTHB FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF mAHo, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

STATE OF IDAHO

Case No: CR-2014-2620
Plaintiff,

vs.

MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD AND
STIPULATION

EDWARD NICHOLAS BURSIEL,
DOB:
SSN:

BCSO#JJJ·0o6212

Defendant.
COMES NOW Louis E. Marshall, Bonner County Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby moves the
Court to augment the record with the ad<lition of an Affidavit by both counsel.
This Motion is necessary as Defendant has filed an appeal with the Idaho Court of Appeals
alleging that a plea agreement was violated. Counsel for the State, as well as counsel for the
Defendant, have a continuing ethical duty to provide candor to the Court. The attached Affidavits
demonstrate the plea agreement in this matter was limited to the State stipulating to argue for a
suspended sentence. The issue of an underlying sentence was left open for argument for each party.
DATED this 23 rd day of September, 2015.
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BONNER COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
127 S. First Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 263-6714
Fax# (208) 263-6726

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT

vs.
EDWARD NICHOLAS BURSIEL,
DOB:
SSN:

BCSO#14-006212

Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Bonner )

Louis E. Marshall, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.)

I am over the age of Eighteen (18) and am competent to testify in this

matter.
2.)

I am the Prosecuting Attorney of Bonner County, Idaho.

3.)

I personally handled the above-named case throughout its course here in

Bonner Count-;.
AFFIDAVIT
Page1of3

4.)

There were plea negotiations with Chief Deputy Public Defender Daniel

Taylor regarding this case.
5.)

Those negotiations took place both in conversation as well as through e-

6.)

There was a plea agreement in this case that I would recommend a

mails.

suspended sentence and recommend local jail as a condition of probation.
7.)

There was never an agreement for a specific underlying sentence as part of

a plea agreement.
8.)

The attached e-mails, which are incorporated herewith, outline the plea

agreement. The portions of the e-maijs that have been whited out are irrelevant to the
present case and dealt with a separate criminal matter that Mr. Taylor and I had been
handling at the time.
9.)

I recognize that a specific underlying period of incarceration of three years

fixed, ten years indeterminate, for a total unified sentence of thirteen years was outlined
in the Defendant's written plea of guilty. I did not sign that document.
10.)

I further recognize that at some point during the process Judge Buchanan

said on the record in open court the plea agreement entailed a sentence of three years
fixed, ten years indeterminate, for a total unified sentence of fifteen years. I am
uncertain as to what was transpiring at that time, but I failed to correct the Court at that
moment when it was announced at the time of the Defendant's plea.
11.)

The Court's recitation of the Defendant's written guilty plea in terms of the

proposed sentence does not imply that there was any off-the-record discussion outlining
that particular sentence. And, in fact, the plea agreement was solely that the State
wouid recommend probation and not for a specific underiying term.
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Further this Affiant sayeth not.

DATED this 22nd day of September,

2015.

~--SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before this 22nd day of September, 2015.

°'1£~s~
Commission expires: I ,,, ati"' llO
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Louis Marshall
from:
Sent:
To:
Cc:

Subject:

Daniel D. Taylor
Thursday, July 10, 2014 1:53 PM
Claire Walpole
Louis Marshall (louismarshall@bcpros.org)
RE: Bursiel

ok
From: Claire Walpole
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 1:52 PM
To: Danfel D. Taylor
Subject: RE: Burslel
Need a recommendation on the underlying please.

From: Danlel D. Taylor
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:10 AM
To: cwalpole@co.bonner.ld.us
Subject: FW: Bursiel

From: Louis Marshall
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:09 AM
To: Daniel D. Taylor
Subject: RE: Burslel

Deal on Bursiel- will be requesting local as a condition of probation. Judge B may send him on a retained anyway

From: Daniel D. Taylor
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:02 AM
To: Louis Marshall (louismarshall@bcpros.org)
Subject: Burstel

Probation for Bursiel?

Louis Marshall
From:

Sent
To:
Subject:

Daniel D. Taylor
Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:10 AM

Louis Marshall
RE: Bursiel

Bursiel will p]ead. He said if you would recc probation he would, just got off the
phone with him.
From: Louis Marshall

Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:09 AM
To: Daniel D. Taylor
Subject: RE: Bursiel

Deal on Burslel· will be requesting local as a condition of probation. Judge B may send him on a retained anyway
From: Daniel D. Taylor

Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:02 AM
To: Louis Marshall (louismarshafl@bcpros.org)
Subject: Burslel

Probation for Bursiel?

BONNER. COUNTY PROSECUTING A1TORNEY
127 S. First Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

{208) 263-6714
Fax:1(208)263-6726

IN THE DISTRICI' COUR.TOFTHE FIRST JUDICIALDISTRICl' OFTBE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THB COUNTY OF BONNER

Case No: CR-2014-2620

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT

vs.
EDWARD NICHOLAS BURSIEL,

BCS0#14-006212

DOB:
SSN:

Defendant.
STATE OF IDAHO )
~

County of Bonner )

ss.

Daniel Taylor, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1.)

I am over the age of Eighteen (18) years and competent to testify in this

matter.
2.)

I am the Chief Deputy Public Defender for Bonner County, Idaho.

3.)

I personally handled the above-entitled court case and represented to Mr.

Bursiel throughout his proceedings in District Court here in Bonner County.

APPIDA'Vrl'
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4.)

At the time of this proceeding in July 2014, Claire Walpole was my Legal

Assistant.

5.)

Ms. Walpole created the Defendant's written plea of guilty and put the

proposed underlying sentence as three years fixed. ten years indeterminate, for unified
sentence of thirteen years.
6.)

My discussions and e-mail correspondence with Mr. Marshall did call for a

specified underlying sentence to be argued by the State.
7.)

During the pendency of this matter, the State was taking a stance that it

would be recommending a retained jurisdiction as part of Defendant's sentencing.
8.)

Prior to trial I was able to further negotiate with Mr. Marshall which

accomplished the State being bound to recommend probation as opposed to a retained
jurisdiction.
9.)

The attached e-mails, which are incorporated herewith, are a true

representation of the status of plea negotiations just prior to Defendant pleading guilty.
The deleted portions of the e-mails are irrelevant as they dealt with a separate case that
Mr. Marshall and I had been ~orking on.

.

~ 1day of September, 2015.

DATED this

er this Affiant sayeth not.

'd~f September, 2015.
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Louis Marshall
From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:

Subject:

Daniel D. Taylor
Thursday, July 10, 2014 1:53 PM

Claire Walpole
Louis Marshall (loulsmarshall@bcpros.org)
RE: Bursiel

ok
From: Claire Walpole
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 1:52 PM
To: Daniel o. Taylor
Subject: RE: Burslel
Need a recommendation on the underlying please.

From: Daniel D. Taylor
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:10 AM
To: cwalpole@co.bQnner,ld.us
Subject: FW: Bursfel

From: Louis ·MarshalJ
~t: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:09 AM
To: Dan!el o. Taylor
Subject: RE: Burslel

Deal on Bursiel- w!II be requesting local as a condition of probation. Judge B may send him on a retained anyway

From: Daniel O. Taylor
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:02 AM
To: Louis Marshan (lou1warshall@bcpros.org)
Subject: Burslel

Probation for Bursiel?

1

Louis Marshall
From:

Sent:
To:
Subject:

Daniel 0. Taylor
Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:10 AM
Louis Marshall
RE: Bursiel

Bursiel will plead. He said if you would recc probation he would, just got off the
phone with him.
From: Louis Marshall
. Sent: Thursday, July 10, 201'4 10:09 AM
To: Daniel o. Taylor
Subject: RE: Burslel

Deal on Burslel- will be requesting local as a condition of probation. Judge 8 may send him on a retained anyway

From: Danie! D. Taylor
sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 10:02 AM
To: Louis Marshall (loulsmarshall@bcpros.org)
Subject: Burslel

Probation for Bursiel?

1

ZJ5

28 P 4: 21

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRl~:OF;~~; i ~
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR mE COUN'IY OF BONNER. r, -~- -::;·---

Case No: CR-2014-2620

STATE OF IDAHO

Plaintiff,
ORDER AUGMENTING
RECORD

v.
EDWARD NICHOLAS BURSIEL
DOB:
SSN:
Defendant.

BCSO# 14-006212

Pursuant to the Motion to Augment Record and Stipulation, along with the
accompanying Affidavits of Counsel, and good cause appearing, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the record is augmented by the Affidavits.

i

DATED this~ day of September, 2015.

,

~i

Lvl.}-_
~
·--

~lu-

DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 6q-A day of 0t pfe/'11.IM.__
• 2015, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document as follows:
Louis E. Marshall
Prosecuting Attorney
Coaftaouse mailbox: -Rue ed

CiwY,~ --

Deputy Clerk

Dan Taylor
Chief Deputy Public Defender
Ceurthoase mailbox f'a,)( ed...

